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Abstract 
There is a long-standing literature on the potential for the fiscal transfers induced by 
taxes on emissions to produce a double dividend. This has taken place within the 
context of static models without regions or population mobility. In this paper, we 
examine the potential effects of fiscal transfers induced by emissions taxes in a stock-
flow pollutant problem over multiple regions in the presence of population mobility. 
We show that the induced fiscal transfers influence the time chosen by a social 
welfare maximising decision maker to converge to sustainable pollutant stock targets. 
The precise impact of the induced fiscal transfers on the convergence time is shown to 
depend upon the nature of the stock-flow problem and in particular whether the 
current pollutant stock exceeds or is less than the sustainable level.    
 
JEL Codes:  Q53, R11, H23, H41, H73.  
 
Keywords: air pollution, water pollution, regional economic activity, environmental 
issues, externalities, environmental taxes and subsidies, public goods, inter-
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1. Introduction 
A number of large developed economies, including Germany, the United Kingdom, 
the Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark have introduced national taxes on carbon 
emissions.  The aim is to provide a shadow price for the negative externalities created 
by polluting inputs that contribute to the stock of carbon concentration in the 
atmosphere. The United States and other countries have by contrast tended to focus 
more on regulation and direct action in attempting to mitigate various forms of 
atmospheric emissions.   
 The economic costs and benefits of the different policy instruments available 
for mitigation have been exhaustively debated in the economics literature over a long 
period of time. From this research, there is a tendency to favour market based 
approaches such as Pigouvian type environmental taxes or permit markets to provide 
shadow prices for pollutant emissions. It is well-known that by providing a single 
price for emissions and equalizing marginal abatement costs across firms, taxes and 
market solutions can provide the required mitigation at least cost [Baumol (1972), 
Baumol and Oates (1988)].  
  Apart from their role in establishing efficient prices for negative externalities,  
environmental taxes may also create a "fiscal dividend" if the revenue raised from 
taxes is recycled through government budgets and used, for example, to reduce 
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distortionary taxes elsewhere, counteract adverse distributional consequences or 
create other benefits such as the provision of more public services. There is a long 
standing and extensive literature on the fiscal compensation effects of environmental 
taxes. It is beyond the scope of this paper to provide an exhaustive critique of this 
literature though the interested reader can consult Goulder (1995), Bovenburg (1999), 
Bovenberg and Goulder (2002) and Callan et al (2009) for surveys.  
 Fiscal recycling and compensation are notable features of emissions tax 
schemes adopted in the countries noted above. In Germany, for example, revenue 
from the eco-tax directly offsets pension contributions [see Habler and Roeder 
(2012)] while the Australian emissions tax included a compensation package of 
revenue recycling to compensate low income households for the direct effect of the 
tax on energy prices [Meng et al (2013].   
 The question of whether there is a fiscal dividend induced by environmental 
taxes has been considered within the context of static models which focus on pollutant 
flows. In practice, many environmental problems have a stock and a flow aspect to 
them. For example, the flow of pollutants into the atmosphere from economic 
activities in individual countries adds to the common stock of existing pollutants (e.g. 
carbon). For river and lake systems, such as the Murray-Darling basin in Australia or 
the Great Lakes of North America, the flow of pollutants from agricultural and 
industrial activities adds to the existing stock of pollutants in natural systems. 
Balanced against this, pollutants are naturally sequestered and this tends to reduce the 
pollutant stock. When the flow of new pollutants exceeds the rate of absorption, then 
the stock, which matters for welfare, increases over time.  
 Stock-flow problems have a well-known theoretical structure [see Perman and 
McGilvray (2003)]. The pollutant stock is treated as a pure public bad generating 
negative externalities that reduce social welfare. The current quantity of the public 
bad is assumed to be given. There is also some desired future quantity which is 
estimated from scientific rather than economic decision models. Important questions 
of economic interest are then as follows: (i) which mitigation instruments should 
governments use; (ii) what is the nature of the optimal transition path for the pollutant 
stock; and (iii)  how is the optimal convergence time determined and what should it 
depend upon?  
 Given the discussion above, the purpose of our paper is to consider the social 
welfare effects of fiscal recycling in stock flow pollution problems when emissions 
taxes are used for mitigation. It is also supposed that the emissions flow is constant 
and the transition path can be determined at the beginning of the transition phase and 
does not require any adjustment during the transition period. We then focus on 
question (iii) above; namely, determining the optimal convergence time in stock-flow 
pollutant problems when there is fiscal recycling. We also consider this problem in a 
regional context with population mobility across regions in response to differences in 
per capita social welfare arising from underlying production technologies. This means 
any solution to the optimal convergence time problem cannot make people in one 
region better or worse off than their neighbours in other regions. As far as we know, 
this is the first time the fiscal transfers induced by emissions taxes have been 
examined in a regional context with population mobility and a stock-flow pollutant. 
 Our model is of a particular stock-flow pollutant; the concentration of carbon 
in the atmosphere, though the results generalize to any stock-flow problem. It 
assumes that the global economy consists of two distinct regions which differ only in 
terms of their production technology for generating emissions from an energy input. 




atmosphere which is modelled as a pure public bad. The world population has 
homogenous preferences over a local public good provided by regions and a private 
consumption good. Since regional production technologies differ per capita incomes 
can vary across regions. People are mobile and make their location choices to equate 
per capita inter-temporal welfare. There is a known current quantity for the 
concentration of carbon in the atmosphere and a desirable (sustainable) quantity, both 
exogenously given.  Given the application to atmospheric carbon pollution, the 
current stock quantity is less than the target (sustainable) quantity.  
 With this basic set up, we suppose there is a mythical social planner who 
chooses the time period, T, in which the actual global pollutant stock should converge 
to its desired level. The planner makes this choice to maximize inter-temporal global 
social welfare which is increasing in the social welfare of the two regions. This 
maximization is undertaken subject to the migration constraint and on the assumption 
that the time path for the global pollutant stock in the transition phase has constant 
emissions. Once convergence to the sustainable stock is achieved, regional economies 
enter a steady state in which sequestration is equal to global emissions and the 
pollutant stock is stable at its target from then on. The mythical planner also levies an 
emissions tax in each region. These taxes play an important role in our model: they 
are the tax rates needed to ensure that mitigation in each region is consistent with 
achieving the global pollutant goal. Tax rates are set once the convergence time is 
chosen by the planner - hence they are not separate decision variables. Importantly for 
our purposes, revenue from the emissions taxes is recycled to residents within each 
region on an equal per capita lump sum basis. 
 From the solution to the social welfare maximisation problem we obtain the 
first order necessary condition for what we call a constrained optimal convergence 
time. We are able to present this condition in terms of the inter-temporal marginal 
benefits and costs of an incremental change in the convergence time. From this, we 
show it is optimal for the fiscal transfers induced by emissions taxes to affect the 
convergence time choice. For the atmospheric problem considered, the induced fiscal 
transfers are shown to delay convergence, while for stock flow problems where the 
current stock  exceeds the target, such as pollution of rivers or lakes, the induced 
fiscal transfers from emissions taxes lead to faster convergence and a shorter 
transition phase.     
 The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 sets out the basic structure of the 
model, including specification of the stock-flow pollution dynamics, regional 
production technologies and emissions taxes, preferences/feasibility, regional social 
welfare and population mobility. Section 3 finds the first order condition for the 
convergence time and presents the main result in relation to the role of induced fiscal 
transfers in a stock-flow problem with regions and population mobility.  Conclusions 
are presented in Section 4 and mathematical details are in the Appendices.    
 
2. Regional economy with population mobility 
Let us assume the global economy is made up of two regions, i = 1,2 , differentiated 
by the intensity of emissions generated by their production process. In other respects, 
regions have the same production technology. The regions can be thought of as two 
blocs, for example, one high income and the other low income, or literally as two 
countries. Let H be the given world population and Hi  be the population of region i, 
for i = 1,2 , where  H = H1 + H2 . The total world population is perfectly mobile across 




per capita inter-temporal indirect utility. Regions also provide a local public good. An 
emissions tax is also levied on emissions in each region to provide a shadow price for 
pollutant emissions. The world population has homogeneous preferences though per 
capita incomes differ across regions as a result of different production technologies. 
The analysis is, therefore, conducted in terms of a representative citizen from each 
region. We now describe the dynamics associated with global pollutant emissions.  
 
2.1 Global pollutant dynamics     
Define  G(t)  as the global stock of CO2eq, a pure public bad, which adversely affects 
the welfare of people in both regions equally. The value of the pollutant stock is a 
function of time, t, where  is divided into two periods.  In the first, 
time runs from some base year, t = 0 , to a convergence year,  t = T , where the stock 
becomes equal to G , which we think of the sustainable quantity of the pollutant stock  
assumed to be exogenously given from the perspective of our economic model. We 
think of  G  as determined by scientific analysis of the sustainable quantity of CO2eq 
in the atmosphere to which the global economy must adjust over time.  For purposes 
of discussion here, we assume this to be 450 ppm of CO2eq consistent with one of the 
main scenarios in IPCC (2013), but in general it can be any quantity.  Also, denote 
G0  as the current stock of CO2eq at time t = 0 .  We assume this to be 400 ppm 
CO2eq based on Mauna Loa Observatory data for 2015 though it can be any given 
quantity less than the target.  The second period is a steady-state where the CO2eq 
pollutant stock stabilizes at the sustainable quantity and remains there from the 
convergence year to infinity.   
 Let G, t (t) = g −δG(t)  be the differential equation for the global CO2eq stock 
in the transition period where  is the total flow of carbon emissions and  is the 
rate of sequestration.  We assume the emissions flow to be constant in the transition 
period while the rate of sequestration, , is a parameter in the transition phase and 
the steady-state. An alternative to assuming a constant emissions flow is to explore 
the optimal path for emissions using optimal control. This would allow us to examine 
the dynamic optimality of the trade-off between accumulation of the pollutant stock 
and emissions in the transition phase. This is an extremely important and interesting 
normative economic problem: to find the optimal time path for emissions consistent 
with maximising inter-temporal welfare. We do not tackle this in our paper for the 
following reasons. In practice policy-makers tend not to follow optimal paths.  This 
would require frequent adjustments in emissions, both up and down, throughout the 
transition phase as optimality necessitates that emissions adjust inter-temporally. The 
reality of policy-making is that the political process has difficulty agreeing to any 
transition path, let alone one that is optimal. In this environment, a transition path 
with constant emissions is just as likely to be chosen by policy-makers as any other.  
In this sense, our analysis can be thought of as positive rather than normative.   
 Our model also incorporates the complexity of local public goods, taxes and 
population mobility and the assumption of constant emissions greatly assists 
tractability. More specifically, a constant emissions flow in the transition phase allows 
us to collapse the dynamics into a quasi-static problem.  This can be seen by noting 
that the solution to the differential equation for the pollutant stock is:  
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A given sustainable CO2eq stock, combined with the constancy of emissions during 
the transition phase, creates a unique relation between emissions and the time when 
the actual stock of CO2eq converges to its exogenously given environmentally 
sustainable quantity.  This relation is a result of the model set-up and is not due to the 
form of the first order differential equation.  The relationship between g and T is:2 
  
 
g(T ) = δ G −G0e
−δT( ) 11− e−δT .    (2.2) 
Hence, during the transition period from  to  the total emissions flow  is a 
function of T, conditional on the rate of sequestration.  Given this, the solution to the 
differential equation for the global stock of CO2eq becomes: 
  
 





e−δ t + g(T )
δ
.   (2.3) 
 From equation (2.3), once T is chosen so too is  G(g(T ),t)  in the transition 
period.  As will be discussed in Section 3, we assume that T is chosen by a social 
planner to maximize global social welfare. In selecting T, we are choosing the inter-
temporal quantity of the global public bad. With constant transition period emissions, 
the pollutant stock is an exponential function of time, as shown in Figure 1 below, 
where  G0 = 400  is the current quantity of the CO2eq stock and  G0 = 450  is the given 
sustainable quantity to be reached by some convergence time  T *  [quantities drawn 
from United Nations (2013)].   
 Hence, the current quantity of the pollutant stock is lower than the target 
quantity, that is,  G0 < G . This makes it clear that the aim of policy is to increase the 
stock of CO2eq from its current level to the target level.  The target level is of course 
lower than it would otherwise be absent policy action over emissions. When we think 
of achieving a sustainable CO2eq stock it is not immediately apparent that our goal is 
to increase the current stock to the sustainable quantity, but this is the aim of policy as 
made clear by Figure 1.  
 On the other hand, if  G0 > G , as would be the case with river basin or lake 
pollution, then the transition path path depicted in Figure 1 is inverted with the actual 
pollutant stock decreasing in t during the transition phase. In that type of stock-flow 
problem, the policy problem is to decrease the current pollutant stock to its 
sustainable quantity over some period of time. As will be noted, our results apply to 
both types of problem even though our focus is on the case depicted in Figure 1. 
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   We allocate the total emissions flow required during the transition period to 
meet the sustainable global CO2eq stock target between the two regions on an equal 
per capita basis.  Implicit here is the assumption of an exogenously given policy rule 
which allocates the burden of achieving the sustainable global CO2eq stock equally 
across the two regions on a per capita basis.  Other sharing rules are possible and our 
results do not depend on what is adopted.  However, it seems equitable to assume 
such an allocation rule. This means region-specific emissions, gi (T ) , consistent with 
the global sustainable CO2eq stock target, are also a function of T during the transition 
period and we can define:  
   gi(T ) = ξig(T ) ,    i = 1,2    (2.4)  
where  ξi = Hi / H  for  i = 1,2 .  This implies that the per capita emissions flow in each 
region is equal to the global per capita emissions flow; hence  gi(T ) / Hi = ξig(T ) / H  
for  i = 1,2 . For the CO2eq stock to be constant in the steady-state global emissions 
must equal sequestration, that is,  g = δG .   Steady state emissions from region i are: 
   g i = ξiδG .     i = 1,2    (2.5) 
In the steady state, per capita emissions in each region are equal to the global per 
capita emission flow, namely,  gi / Hi = g / H  for  i = 1,2 . 
 Having described the pollutant dynamics, we now develop the structure of 
production technologies in each region. This is the key source of asymmetry in our 
model. In addition to this, we develop expressions for the emissions taxes and explain 





 g = δG
t	
 G(t)
 G = 450 ppm
 G0 = 400 ppm
 t ≥ T * t = 0 (e.g. 2016)  t = T
*




2.2 Production technologies and emissions taxes    
Output per capita in region i is defined by the continuous, differentiable and quasi-
concave production function,  
   yi = Ai(t)ki
αmi
β    i = 1,2    (2.6) 
where Ai (t)  is a technical change variable, a function of time.  We define  ki  as a non-
polluting input and  mi  as an energy input generating emissions. The creation of 
emissions is proportional to the usage of the polluting enery input as captured by the 
relationship  mi = µigi  for  i = 1,2  where  0 ≤ µi  is the given region-specific rate at 
which emissions are converted into units of the polluting input.  With this set-up, the 
higher is µi  the lower the emissions created by a given usage of the input.  Thus, 
production in region i is cleaner with higher µi , and dirtier with a lower µi . Regional 
variation in µi  is a source of difference in production technologies of the two regions. 
For example, a region with a service based economy is more likely to have a larger  µi  
than a region with a manufacturing economy.  
 Denote ω  and  r  as given world prices for the polluting and non-polluting 
inputs respectively.  There is also a region-specific per unit emission abatement tax, 
si , where i = 1,2 , levied on the polluting input.  The constraint  rki + (ω + si )mi = Ei , 
for  i = 1,2 , defines per capita spending on inputs by firms in region i where  Ei  is total 
spending.  In Appendix A, we derive the demand function for the polluting and non-
polluting inputs from a problem in which firms choose the two inputs to maximize 
output, subject to the spending constraint.  From Appendix A, per capita (least cost) 










    i = 1,2 ,  (2.7) 
where   ε = β / (α + β ) .  Equation (2.7) implies that per capita demand for the input is 
continuous and monotonically decreasing in its own-price and the emission tax.        
 To derive the emission taxes that need to apply in each region, recall, first, that 
equation (2.7) expresses least cost per capita demand for the polluting input as a 
function of the tax for given values of the input price and production parameters.  
Notice, next, that from the discussion of equation (2.4) the allowable per capita usage 
of the polluting input in each region consistent with the chosen compliance time is 
defined by  µig(T ) / H .  Now set the least cost demand for the polluting equal to the 






.      i = 1,2    (2.8) 
This leads us to: 
Definition 1: The transition period emissions tax is the value of  si  which satisfies 
equation (2.8). That is:  
 








−ω .   i = 1,2    (2.9) 
The tax defined at equation (2.9) plays a special role in our model. Specifically, once 
T is chosen by the social planner, it ensures that per capita usage of the polluting input 




global CO2eq stock to its sustainable quantity,  G , by period T.  In principle, si  can be 
positive (a tax) or negative (a subsidy) depending on the value of  relative to the 
first term on the right side of equation (2.9). However, for reasonable choices of the 
parameters in equation (2.9) si  is positive and this is what we suppose henceforth.    
 The emissions tax differs across regions based on differences in µi  where 
i = 1,2 . If µ2 < µ1 , implying region 2 produces more emissions for given energy 
input usage, then s2 > s1  and region 2 requires a relatively higher emissions tax to 
ensure its input usage and emissions flow are consistent with achieving the global 
sustainable stock target by the chosen compliance time. The reverse logic holds if 
µ2 > µ1 ; region 2 will require a relatively lower emissions tax to ensure its energy 
input usage and emissions flow are consistent with achieving the sustainable stock.   
 The emissions taxes act like Pigouvian taxes [see Pigou (1936)]. The tax 
inclusive price for the polluting input is defined as ω + si  where i=1,2. Notice that 
while the underlying price for the input is the same across regions the tax inclusive 
prices differ because the emission tax is different. The tax inclusive price is higher in 
the region with the larger per unit emissions. Also, once  T  is chosen so too are the 
emissions taxes and the tax inclusive energy prices consistent with ensuring regional  
emissions are consistent with achieving the global pollutant stock target.   
 Similarly, the following condition sets the least cost demand for the polluting 
energy input equal to the allowable per capita usage consistent with the steady-state 






.    i = 1,2    (2.10) 
Definition 2: The steady-state emissions tax is the value of  si  which satisfies equation 
(2.10). That is:   









⎟ −ω .   i = 1,2    (2.11) 
The steady-state emissions tax ensures per capita demand for the energy input in a 
region is consistent with the per capita emissions flow required in the steady-state to 
keep the global CO2eq stock constant (e.g., at  G = 450  ppm from Figure 1).  
 Using equations (2.8) and (2.9) in the firm's optimization problem from 






















. i=1,2.  (2.12) 
If µ1 > µ2 , then y1 > y2  and vice-versa during the transition period.  The region with 
relatively lower emissions can have higher per capita output in the transition period 
and still have the same per capita emissions as the relatively higher emission region.  
 Utilizing equations (2.10) and (2.11) in the firms' optimization problem in 
























  i = 1,2 . (2.13) 
                                                





As with the transition period, the region with the cleaner production technology has 
higher per capita output in the steady state while still complying with the sustainable 
stock. 
 
2.3 Preferences and regional feasibility 
As noted earlier, we assume the world population has homogeneous preferences 
though as we shall see per capita incomes can differ across regions. However, since 
per capita incomes are the same within a region, the analysis can proceed in terms of a 
representative person from each region.  This person is assumed to have a continuous, 
differentiable and concave utility function with the following form; 
   ui = log(xiqi )−G(g(T ),t)   i = 1,2 .  (2.14) 
 Here we define xi  as per capita consumption of a private good,  as 
consumption of a pure local public good and G(g(T ),t)  as the global CO2eq stock 
from equation (2.3) - a pure public bad.  The pure local public good provides a benefit 
only to the residents of the region in which it is provided and hence has no inter-
regional spillovers. It can be thought of as any one of the services provided by 
governments such as education, health or public transport which benefits only the 
residents of the region. The pure public bad, the global CO2eq stock, affects everyone 
in the world negatively and equally. Thus, it can also be interpreted as a local public 
bad with perfect inter-regional spillovers. With this functional form, utility is 
separable in the consumption goods and the global CO2eq stock. It is assumed that the 
price of the private good is fixed at one while the price of the local public good is a 
parameter denoted as ci . Hence, apart from the tax inclusive price of the polluting 
input,  ω + si , which varies with the emissions tax, all prices in our model are fixed.  
Similarly, steady-state per person utility in region i is defined by: 
   ui = log(xiqi )−G .    i = 1,2    (2.15) 
 Per capita revenue from the emissions tax,  Ri , in the transition period is  
  
 
Ri(g(T )) = siµi
g(T )
H
,   i = 1,2    (2.16) 
where  si  is the emissions tax defined by equation (2.9) and  µig(T ) / H  is the per 
capita polluting input usage consistent with the choice of convergence time.  






      i = 1,2 .  (2.17) 
 In the transition period and the steady-state, we assume that the emissions tax 
revenue in each region is recycled to the population of the region on an equal per 
capita lump sum basis by the government of the region. Per capita income in region i  
can then be defined as, 
   π i(g(T )) = yi(g(T ))+ Ri(g(T )) ,  i = 1,2    (2.18) 
while for the steady state per capita income becomes:   
   π i = yi + Ri .     i = 1,2 .  (2.19) 
 With the revenue from the emissions tax distributed in this way, the feasible 
constraint in region i during the transition period is  





where xiHi  is total expenditure on private consumption, ciqi  is total spending on the 
local public good and  π i(g(T ))Hi  is total income which, from equation (2.18), is 
equal to produced income plus revenue from the emissions tax. With this set up, 
revenue from the emissions tax is added to produced output to form an intermediate 
(numeraire) good which is then converted into private consumption and the local 
public good through equation (2.20).  This assumption is a simple device to proxy all 
the different ways that revenue from emissions taxes is recycled to fund the provision 
of government services and private good consumption.  Since it is provided to citizens 
lump sum this recycling has no efficiency costs in our model.  
 Similarly, in the steady-state the feasible constraint is 
   xi Hi + ciqi = π i Hi .    i = 1,2    (2.21) 
Since  π i  is fixed and  Hi  is independent of T in the steady-state, citizen income  π i Hi  
and hence public and private consumption, are given in the steady-state.   
 We assume for the transition period and the steady state that provision of the 
local public good in both regions is consistent with an efficiency rule.  Expressions 
for local public good provision consistent with this rule are derived in Appendix B.  
Substituting them into the direct utility function allows us to derive indirect utility 
functions for a representative person in each region. For the transition period, indirect 
utility for a representative person in region i is given by  
 
 




−G(g(T ),t)    i = 1,2 ,  (2.22) 
while in the steady state it is     
 
 




−G  .    i = 1,2    (2.23) 
 
2.4 Regional social welfare and population mobility 
Suppose the welfare of a representative person in region i is the sum of their indirect 
utility in the transition period time and the steady-state, as defined at equations (2.22) 
and (2.23) above.  We think of this sum as defining a social welfare function,  Wi , for 
region i, where  i = 1,2 .  A convenient presentation of the social welfare function for a 
region is as follows,  
  














∫ − e−ρtG(g(T ),t)dt0
∞
∫ − e−ρt G dtT
∞
∫ .
   i = 1,2 . (2.24) 
 Recall that we also allow the global population to be freely mobile between 
the two regions. With free inter-regional population mobility per capita inter-temporal 
social welfare must be the same across the two regions in any equilibrium. This 
implies that the convergence choice, T, must be consistent with the following 
migration constraint:  
  W1(g(T ))−W2(g(T )) = 0 .      (2.25) 
From the free mobility condition, during the transition period the supply of mobile 
citizens in each region is, implicitly, a function of the choice of convergence time.  
For the transition period we can, therefore, define Hi (T ) , for i = 1,2 , so the spatial 
allocation of mobile citizens in the global economy is dependent on the transition 
time.  However, in the steady-state the supply of mobile citizens to each region is 




3. Optimal convergence time and induced fiscal transfers 
We now turn to the main result of the paper; that on social welfare grounds the fiscal 
transfers induced by the use of emissions taxes to achieve a sustainable pollutant 
stock target affects the time taken to converge to the target.  This holds for stock flow 
problems whether the current stock is lower or higher than the target.  We begin by 
assuming the world social welfare function,  W (T ) , is the sum of the two regional per 
capita social welfare functions as follows, 
  W (T ) = ΔW1 g(T )( ) + (1− Δ)W2 g(T )( ) ,    (3.1) 
where  0 ≤ Δ ≤1  is the weight placed on region 1 in the global social welfare function,  
 0 ≤ Δ ≤1  is the weight on region 2 while  W1 g(T )( )  and  W2 g(T )( )  are the regional 
welfare functions, defined at equation (2.23).  To find the value of T that maximizes 
global social welfare, given that we have an exponential CO2eq stock transition path 





W = ΔW1 g(T )( ) + (1− Δ)W2 g(T )( )
Sto : W1 g(T )( )−W2(g(T )) = 0.
    (3.2) 
The solution proceeds by differentiating the objective function in this maximization 




























dt − 2 e−ρt
0
T
∫ G,g g,T dt = 0










= g,T < 0  
capture how the global CO2eq stock responds to changes in emissions and emissions 
respond to changes in the transition time.  An expression for the emissions response to 
a change in the convergence time is derived in Appendix D.  
 The terms  
H1,T  and  
H2,T  in equation (3.3) capture the population supply 
response in each region to a change in the transition time. Expressions for these 
population responses can be found by totally differentiating the equal utility constraint 
with respect to  H1, H2  and T to obtain:  
 
 



















H1,T .       (3.5) 
 Combining equations (3.4) and (3.5) with (3.3) yields the first order necessary 
condition for the convergence time which takes account of the migration constraint, 















dt − 2 e−ρt
0
T
∫ G,g g,T dt = 0 . (3.6) 
                                                




A solution to the global social welfare maximization problem is a value, T * , that 
solves equation (3.6).  Notice that because we have allowed the world population to 
be mobile across regions, T *  must also satisfy the equal utility constraint. It must be a 
convergence time in which a person in region 1 has the same indirect utility as her 
counterpart in region 2. The outcome is equitable if we place the same welfare weight 
on people who live in different regions in the social welfare function.5 However, a T 
that solves equation (3.6) can only be thought of as 'constrained optimal' since we 
have assumed an exponential transition path with a constant global emissions flow.  
 Once the convergence time is chosen by the social planner so too is the 
constant global emissions flow consistent with achieving the target pollutant stock. 
This also means regional emissions taxes that ensure regional emissions are consistent 
with achieving the global target by  T *  are also determined. Though the social planner 
has one instrument, in choosing this she determines the dynamics of the model as set 
out in Section 2.1 and illustrated in Figure 1. Given that regions provide local public 
goods efficiently she also determines local public good provision, income and private 
good consumption in each region. Therefore, once  T *  is chosen, all the endogenous 
variables of the model are determined. 
 The first two terms in equation (3.6) capture the inter-temporal effect of an 
incremental change in T on numeraire income in regions 1 and 2 respectively. The last 
term captures the impact of an incremental change in T on the CO2eq pollutant stock. 
It is helpful for our results below to break up the impact of an incremental change in T 
on numeraire income into its impact on emissions tax revenue and produced output 
(the two components that make up numeraire income). This means we can express the 















































 The first term captures the impact of an incremental change in T on the 
emissions tax revenue raised in region 1 during the transition phase. We call this the 
fiscal effect of an incremental change in T experienced by region 1. It captures the 
change in fiscal transfers induced in region 1 by an incremental change in T in the 
transition period. The second term captures the effect of an incremental change in T 
on produced output in region 1. We think of this as an output effect. The next two 
terms are analogous fiscal and output effects for region 2. The last term captures the 
impact of incremental increase in T on the CO2eq pollutant stock. The first order 
necessary condition for T sums these terms across regions and ensures they are equal 
to zero in net terms.  
 We can sign the fiscal, output and CO2eq stock effects of an incremental 
change in T appearing in equation (3.7) for the case where the current stock is less 
                                                
5 A set of second order sufficient conditions for existence of a solution is provided in Appendix C. We 
assume these conditions hold, assuring us of the existence of at least one solution. If the conditions are 
not satisfied equilibria may still exist as our conditions are sufficient and not necessary. The question 




than the sustainable quantity. We can then say which terms are considered by the 
planner to be marginal benefits or costs of incremental increases in T. Start by 
noticing from Appendix D that for this case the emissions flow in the transition period 
is decreasing in T; that is, g,T < 0 .  Note also that  
Ri,T = Ri,g g,T  where,  





µi < 0     i = 1,2 .  (3.8) 
This means that  
Ri,T > 0 , and the induced fiscal effects of an incremental increase in T 
are positive in each region. That is,  FE1 > 0  and  FE2 > 0  in equation (3.7). The social 
planner considers the fiscal effects of an incremental change in T to be marginal 
benefits. It is also the case that  


















g(T )( )β−1 > 0 .  i = 1,2   (3.9) 
Since  
g,T < 0 , then  
yi,T = yi,g g,T < 0  and the output effects of an incremental increase 
in T are negative. This means that  OE1 < 0  and  OE2 < 0  in equation (3.7). The output 
effects can be interpreted as marginal costs of an increment in T.  Lastly, we know 
that  
G,g > 0 , so if g,T < 0  we have   
G,g g,T < 0 .  This implies that the stock effect is a 
marginal benefit of an incremental increase in T since G is a pure public bad; that is, 
 SE > 0 . 
 Given the above signs, the first order necessary condition, equation (3.7), can 
be expressed as an equality between marginal benefit and marginal cost when the 
current pollutant stock is less than the sustainable quantity as follows: 
  
 






.    (3.10) 
By increasing the marginal benefit associated with any given T, without affecting the 
marginal cost, the fiscal effects induced by recycling the revenue from emissions 
taxes result in a larger T in any solution to the global welfare maximization problem. 
Convergence to the target sustainable global CO2eq stock is delayed by the fiscal 
consequences of using emissions taxes when the current pollutant stock is less than 
the sustainable quantity. This is illustrated in Figure 2 below. 
 In the Figure, there is a single marginal cost curve which is the sum of the two 
output effects; that is,  MC = OE1 +OE2 .  If there is no revenue recycling from the 
emissions tax, the marginal benefit curve captures only the stock effect of increased 
T; that is,  MB0 = SE . An equilibrium convergence time,  T 0 , occurs at point B where 
 MB0 = MC . However, if there is revenue recycling as we suppose the marginal 
benefit curve is  MB = FE1 + FE2 + SE  and the equilibrium convergence time,  T
* , is 
at point A where  T * > T 0 .  As shown, the impact of revenue recycling when the 







 For the case where the current pollutant stock is greater than the sustainable 
stock, as with river or lake pollution, the fiscal transfers induced by emissions taxes 
reduce the  convergence time. From Appendix D we can see the emissions flow in the 
transition period is increasing in T, that is, g,T > 0 .  Note also that  
Ri,T = Ri,g g,T  
where,  





µi < 0     i = 1,2 .  (3.11) 
This means that  
Ri,T < 0  when the current pollutant stock is more than the target and 
the induced fiscal effects in region i of an incremental increase in T are negative. That 
is,  FE1 < 0  and  FE2 < 0 . The social planner now considers the fiscal effects of an 
incremental increase in T to be marginal costs. As before, we know that   
yi,T = yi,g g,T  
where  
yi,g > 0 . Since g,T  is now positive, we know that  
yi,T = yi,g g,T > 0  and the 
output effects of an incremental increase in T are now positive. This means that 
 OE1 > 0  and  OE2 > 0 . The output effects can be interpreted as marginal benefits of an 
increment in T.  Lastly, we know that  
G,g > 0 , so if g,T > 0  we have  
G,g g,T > 0 . The 
social planner now perceives the stock effect to be a marginal cost of an incremental 
increase in T; that is,  SE < 0  in equation (3.7).  
 Therefore, the first order necessary condition for T when the current pollutant 
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= FE1 + FE2 + SE
marg inal cost
! "## $##
.    (3.12) 
By increasing the marginal cost for a given T, without affecting the marginal benefit,  
the fiscal effects induced by recycling the revenue from emissions taxes result in a 
smaller T in any solution to the global welfare maximization problem.6 Therefore, 
convergence to the target sustainable global CO2eq stock is quickened by the fiscal 
consequences of using emissions taxes when the current pollutant stock is greater than 
the sustainable quantity. This is illustrated in Figure 3.  
 In the Figure, there is one marginal benefit curve which is the sum of the two 
output effects; that is,  MB = OE1 +OE2 .  If there is no revenue recycling from the 
emissions tax, the marginal cost curve captures only the stock effect of increased T; 
that is,  MC0 = SE . An equilibrium convergence time,  T 0 , occurs at point B where 
 MB = MC0 . However, if there is revenue recycling as we suppose the marginal cost 
curve is  MC = FE1 + FE2 + SE  and the equilibrium convergence time,  T
* , is at point 
A where  T * < T 0 .  The impact of revenue recycling when the current pollutant stock 
exceeds the sustainable target, is to hasten convergence. 
 
 
                                                
6 Comparing equation (3.12) with equation (3.11), a symmetry between the choice of T for each 
pollutant problem is apparent. When we switch between the case where the current stock is less than 
the sustainable value (Figure 2) and the case where the current stock exceeds the sustainable value 
(Figure 3) the marginal benefits and costs of a change in T interchange in the first order necessary 






 MC = FE1 + FE2 + SE
 MB = OE1 +OE2
 T 0
MC = MB  MC0 = SE
MC 0 = MB
T *






 This completes our presentation of the results. The key point we wish to make 
is that when emissions taxes are used for mitigation and we consider an economy 
made up of regions where population mobility imposes an equal utility constraint on 
any solution, the time it takes to converge to a sustainable target in stock-flow 
pollutant problems should take account of the induced fiscal effects of revenue 
recycling. What is more, when the current stock is less than the sustainable target, the 
fiscal effects are marginal benefits of an incremental increase in T and result in 
delayed convergence relative to a case of no revenue recycling. However, if the 
current stock exceeds the sustainable target, the fiscal effects are marginal costs and 
result in faster convergence to the sustainable target relative to a case with no 
recycling. Hence, the precise impact of recycling on the choice of convergence time 
depends on the nature of the stock flow problem being considered. 
 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have noted that the effects of fiscal transfers induced by emissions 
taxes have been extensively examined within the context of static models with no 
regions or population mobility. Therefore, we have set out to examine the impact of 
these transfers in a stock flow pollutant problem with regions and population 
mobility. To do this, we have constructed a model of a stock flow pollutant where the 
current stock is less than the future sustainable stock. We have thought of this as 
capturing the particular case of atmospheric carbon pollution. Though we have 
focused on this case, we have also presented our results for a case in which the current 
pollutant stock exceeds the sustainable quantity.  
 We consider an economy consisting of two regions which generate emissions 
contributing to a common stock of pollutant (carbon in the atmosphere). The total 
population has homogenous preferences over a local public good provided by regions 
and a private consumption good. This population is also mobile across regions in 
response to the choice of convergence time. We suppose a social planner chooses the 
time it takes for the actual global pollutant stock to converge to its desired level using 
emissions taxes in each region as mitigation instruments. The planner makes this 
choice to maximize inter-temporal global social welfare with equal weights on the 
two regions. The maximization is undertaken subject to the migration constraint and 
on the assumption that the time path for the global pollutant stock in the transition 
phase has constant emissions. Revenue from the emissions taxes is recycled to 
residents within each region on an equal per capita lump sum basis. 
 The main finding  from this analysis is that the optimal convergence time in a 
world with a stock flow pollutant, emissions taxes, regions and free mobility is in part 
determined by the fiscal transfers induced by the emissions taxes. On social welfare 
grounds the time taken to converge to sustainable stock targets should take account of 
the fiscal effects of transfers induced by emissions taxes. This is so whether we are 
dealing with a stock flow pollutant problem where the current stock exceeds the 
sustainable quantity (river or lake pollution) or one in which the current stock is less 
than the sustainable quantity (atmospheric carbon pollution).  We also demonstrate a 
symmetry between the two types of pollutant stock problems. When the current stock 
exceeds the sustainable level, the fiscal effects are a cost of delayed convergence and 
tend to shorten the convergence time.  If the current stock is less than the sustainable 
quantity the fiscal effects induced by emissions taxes are a marginal benefit from 
delayed convergence, tending to lengthen the convergence time. 
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Appendix A 
Polluting input demand 








s.t. rki + (ω + si )mi = Ei
    i = 1,2    (A.1) 
For  Ei = 1 , the expenditure constraint implies  
   
ki = (1/ r) ⋅ 1− ω + si( )mi⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ ,      (A.2) 






1− ω + si( )mi⎡⎣ ⎤⎦
α
mi
β    i = 1,2    (A.3) 






,     i = 1,2    (A.4) 
where  





Provision of local public goods and regional welfare 
We suppose that the government of region i is benevolent and makes its choice of 






















−G(g(T ),t)   i = 1,2    (B.1)  









    i = 1,2    (B.2) 
Using (B.2) in the objective of (B.1) yields the indirect (maximum value) function for 
region i in the transition period as: 
 
 




−G(g(T ),t) .   i = 1,2    (B.3) 
This can be expressed more conveniently as 
  Vi = log Hi + logπ i
2 −G(g(T ),t)−Ci , i = 1,2    (B.4)   
where  Ci = log4ci  is a constant, independent of the convergence time.   
 From the main text,  Hi(T )  and  π i  are functions of the convergence time 
chosen by the social planner.  Hence, during the transition period we have: 
  
qi(T ) = Hi(T )
π i(T )
2ci
, xi(T ) =
π i(T )
2
.    (B.5)  
Given efficient regional government behaviour, local public good provision and 
private consumption in each region are chosen by the social planner once she chooses 
the convergence time T. 
In the steady-state, the pollutant stock is  and household utility becomes  
  ui = log(xiqi )−G .    i = 1,2    (B.6)  
The steady state household budget constraint is  Hixi + ciqi = Hiπ i  where  π i  is 
steady-state household income, as defined in the main text.  Solving an analogous 
problem to (B.1) above, indirect utility in the steady-state is   
 
 




−G  .    i = 1,2    (B.7) 
This can be expressed as 
  Vi = log Hi + logπ i
2
−G −Ci .      (B.8)  
 The welfare of a representative household in state i (the sum of indirect utility 
in the transition period and steady state), which we also think of as the regional social 
welfare function, is   
 
 
Wi(T ) = e
−ρt log Hi + logπ i
2 −G(g(T ),t)⎡⎣ ⎤⎦dt0
T
∫










.  (B.9)  



















∫ − e−ρtG(g(T ),t)dt0
∞
∫ − e−ρt G dtT
∞
∫ .
  (B.10) 
Appendix C 
Second order sufficient conditions 
If Wi (g(T )) , the social welfare function in region i, for i = 1,2 , is concave in T then 
so too is the global social welfare function.  To check this, differentiate the first order 



























∫ G,gg g,T2 +G,g g,TT( )dt − e−ρtG,g g,T
 
where  −i   denotes the neighbor of state i.  Noting that π i,T = π i,gg,T  this becomes: 
 



























∫ G,ggg,T2 +G,gg,TT( )dt − e−ρtG,g (T )g,T (T )  
One set of sufficient conditions which ensure that Wi,TT < 0  is as follows: 
B1. π i,g
2 g,T
2 −π iπ i,ggg,T
2 ≥ 0  
B2. π i,g g,TT 1− e















−ρtG,g (T )g,T (T ) ≥ 0  






B ≥ 0 , 
where: 
 












 B = e−ρt − e−(ρ+δ )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ . 
Remark 1: B1-B3 is one of many possible sets of sufficient conditions that ensure 
concavity of the objective function of state i in the choice variable T.  Any conditions 
that ensure Wi,TT < 0  can be used.  Though the issue of the least restrictive set of 
conditions is interesting, it is beyond the scope of the paper.  
Remark 2: Condition B1 represents the derivative of income effect whereas B2-B3 
jointly represent the derivative of the pollutant stock effect.  
 It is useful to see if the sufficient condition holds when the current stock is less 




= 8.647 , 1− e
−(ρ+δ )
ρ +δ
= 0.9065 .    
And hence 











⎥ = 7.739 > 0  




 B = e−ρt − e−(ρ+δ )⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ = −0.6834 < 0 . 
From Annex E,  
g,T < 0, g,TT > 0  and hence B3 holds, except for small values of t.  For 
B2 to hold requires  
 
g,TT 1− e
−ρt( ) + g,T e−ρt⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ ≤ 0  
since π 2,g > 0 .  Noting that (1− e
−ρt ) > 0  and e−ρt > 0 , given that  g,T < 0, g,TT > 0  








= 6.3909   
which is plausible.  Now consider condition B1.  For this to hold requires 
 π 2,g
2 ≥ π 2π 2,g,g . 
Once again, it is plausible that this is satisfied.  Thus, there are no severe restrictions 
required for the sufficient condition to be satisfied. 
Appendix D 
Emission flow responses 














































⎦ .   
From this   
 




g,T > 0, g,TT < 0 if G0 > G  (river/lake pollution). 
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